A large body of literature investigates the productivity impacts of product and labor market imperfections, and of the anticompetitive regulations establishing and supporting them (see Aghion and Howitt, 2009 , for a survey). This paper greatly extends the scope of previous studies that focus on the effect of product market regulation in non-manufacturing industries on the productivity of all industries (see Conway et al., 2006 , Barone and Cingano, 2011 , Bourlès et al., 2013 , and Cette, Lopez and Mairesse, 2013 .
To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to assess the consequences on productivity of anti-competitive regulations in product and labor markets through their effects on production prices and wages Our approach is theoretically grounded in the model developed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , which "is built on two basic assumptions: monopolistic competition in the goods market, which determines the size of rents; and bargaining in the labor market, which determines the distribution of rents between workers and firm." (pp. 879-880) . In other words, firms can take advantage of the market power induced by product market anti-competitive regulations to charge higher production prices which generate rents. Workers can capture through higher wages a share of these rents, which varies with their bargaining power, itself largely influenced by labor market regulations. Our empirical framework is an attempt to assess the productivity impact of regulations as mediated by their effects on production prices and wages. We include the log USA multi-factor productivity for industry in order to control mainly for exogenous technical changes at industry level. We choose the USA, which is at the world productivity frontier in most industries, as an appropriate reference country for our analysis. 
I. Data and Regression Equation

II. Estimation and main results
A few words on the estimation strategy are useful. Entering in regression (1) 
III. Simulations of the potential impact of structural reforms
The estimation results for regression (1) cannot unambiguously be interpreted in terms of productivity impacts of anticompetitive regulations in the product and are not biased by short-term correlations between the variables and the idiosyncratic error , and that we can consider them as long-term parameters.
labor markets, and thus cannot directly be used to assess the potential effects of structural reforms in these markets.
Moreover, despite the great care we have taken to avoid specification error biases in estimating our regression model, it is indeed important to confirm that production prices and wages indirectly capture the impacts of regulations. We address these two issues by 
IV. Conclusion
The simulation presented above suggests that nearly all countries, in particular European countries, can expect significant gains in multi-factor productivity over time from economic policies reforming anticompetitive regulations on the product and labor markets.
Our estimates and simulations suffer clearly from various weaknesses, due in particular to the data limitation. They should be taken with particular caution and the policy indications that they suggest considered as tentative. In particular, we do not take into consideration in our analysis the substantial institutional, political and social difficulties that the implementation of such ambitious structural reform programs usually encounter.
